1. The applicant has failed to demonstrate that, in adopting the contested Directive, the Community legislature acted unlawfully or committed a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law designed to confer rights on the applicant. 2. Consequently, the application for damages must be rejected without there being any need to rule on the other conditions giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Community or on the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council in relation to certain annexes to the reply. (official headnotes)
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I. Facts
Directive 2003/87/EC**, which entered into force on the 25th of October 2003, established a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the European Community ('the EU ETS'). The Directive is based on the Community's obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, which were incorporated into the European legal framework by means of Decision 2002/358/EC. 1 The EU ETS assigns emission allowances (each representing the emission of one tonne of CO 2 equivalent) 2 to certain economic sectors. If the operator of an installation covered by the Directive succeeds in reducing its emissions, he may sell the excess CO 2 allowances to other operators who require more. Conversely, if an installation does not succeed in reducing its emissions and is faced with a shortage of allowance, it can buy the necessary allowances from an operator with a surplus.
The applicant, Arcelor SA ('Arcelor' or 'the applicant'), was a steel producer who produced 90 % of its 44 million tons production in 17 plants located in several European Union Member States. As such, Arcelor fell within the ambit of Directive 2003/87/EC at the time of the action on the 15th of January 2004.
3
In its application, Arcelor requested for Articles 4, 6(2)(e), 9, 12(3) and 16(2), (3) and (4), in conjunction with Article 2, Annex I and Annex III, criterion 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC 4 to be declared void by the Court in as far as these provisions applied to installations that produced pig iron or steel.
5 In the alternative, Arcelor asked the Court to annul the contested Directive in its entirety. Moreover, the applicant requested the Court to declare that the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union were bound to compensate for the damage that the applicant had suffered as a result of the adoption of the contested provisions and to bear the financial costs.
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The respondents, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (from now on 7 Hereafter, the parties delivered their observations regarding this case and the oral procedure was closed. The oral procedure was briefly reopened after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on the 1st of December 2009 in order to allow the parties to express their views on the possible consequences of this fact and, in particular, on the entry into force of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
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II. Judgment
The Court's judgment is composed of three parts, dealing with the admissibility of the application for annulment, the admissibility of the application for damages and the soundness of the application for damages respectively.
Admissibility of the application for annulment
In its consideration of the admissibility of the applicant's action, the Court first recalls settled case-law regarding the application of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC. 9 The Court stresses that although the contested Directive is a measure of general application and a real Directive within the meaning of Article 249(4) EC (now Article 288 TFEU), 10 it cannot be excluded that the provisions of such a measure may concern certain individuals directly and individually in a certain set of circumstances.
11 The Court therefore first considers the question whether the applicant is individually concerned and will then, if necessary, proceed to consider whether the applicant is directly concerned by the contested provisions.
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In order for the Court to establish individual concern, the measure must affect the applicant by reason of "certain attributes which are peculiar to them" or by reason of "circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person to whom the measure is addressed".
13 In its assessment, the Court rejects the applicant's argument that the Community legislature, by virtue of certain fundamental (European) principles, should have taken the particular situation of pig iron and steel producers, or at least of the applicant's specific situation, vis-à-vis the situation of operators in other sectors covered by the Directive into account. 14 Moreover, the applicant has not established that the contested provisions infringe its fundamental rights or caused it harm in a way that singled the applicant out from other operators concerned by the same provisions.
15 Based on these arguments, the applicant cannot be considered to be individually concerned under Article 230(4) EC. Neither the fact that the applicant claims to be part of a closed group of operators, which is unlikely to change, nor the claim that certain operators may be more economically affected than others changes this. All operators are affected by these provisions in the same way -economically and legally -and by reason of an objectively determined situation.
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The Court also dismissed the applicant's further arguments regarding its size and its alleged 'unique block-in situation,'
17 since the causal link between any damage arising out of the contested provisions and out of the block-in situation in particular is not established.
18 Importantly, some of the issues raised by the applicant concern situations where the national implementation rules would prove decisive in determining whether damage to the applicant would occur.
19 The fact that the applicant had 'participated' in the decision-making process regarding the contested Directive also fails to distinguish the applicant individually for the purposes of Article 230(4) EC.
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Based on these findings, the Court holds that the applicant is not individually or directly concerned by the contested provisions and therefore declares the application for annulment inadmissible. Moreover, this is not changed by the entry into force of Article 263(4) TFEU since a broad discretion exists regarding the implementation of the Directive:
21 i.e. the Directive cannot be regarded as a regulatory act that does not entail implementation measures.
22
2. Admissibility of the application for damages
In their pleadings, the Parliament and the Council argue that the damages alleged by Arcelor are neither imminent, certain, nor sufficiently identified and that there is no causal link between the contested Directive and the alleged damage. In addition, the applicant did not prove an infringement of the principle of equal treatment through the exclusion of the aluminum and chemicals sectors from the contested Directive. 23 The Court rejects this interpretation, stating that most of the arguments raised by the respondents concern the soundness, not the admissibility of the application.
24 The Court also considered that given the fact that the Directive was yet to be transposed at the time of the application, the harm suffered necessarily had a future element. It is therefore not necessary to specify the exact extent of the harm suffered in the application as a condition of admissibility.
25 Moreover, the applicant did put forward sufficient information to identify the damage it will incur in the future. 26 The Court therefore considered the conditions regarding admissibility to be fulfilled and rejected the respondents' pleas of inadmissibility.
Soundness of the application for damages
Cumulative conditions need to be fulfilled in order to establish non-contractual liability of the Community for unlawful conduct on the part of its organs. The Court refers to these in its assessment of the soundness of the application for damages; notably the alleged unlawful conduct by the institutions, the factual damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct and the said damage. 27 For the applicant's case to have merit, there must be a sufficiently serious breach of the rules of law at issue -of 
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The Court treats the alleged breaches of the right to property, freedom to pursue an economic activity and the principle of proportionality jointly. 33 Regarding the rights to property and the freedom to pursue an economic activity, based on the information provided by the applicant the Court does not consider it proven that the contested provisions infringe these rights or that they are even capable of causing said damage. 34 Moreover the applicant failed to demonstrate that the contested Directive gives rise to a "heavy and disproportionate burden" or that the contested Directive is "manifestly inappropriate to achieve the goal of reducing CO 2 emissions". 35 The Court therefore rejects the pleas of illegality based on these principles.
The applicant's plea regarding the alleged breach of the principle of equal treatment is divided in two parts. In the first part a breach is claimed due to unequal treatment of comparable situations and due to equal treatment of dissimilar situations in the second. The former was also addressed in Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others; 36 the Court therefore refers to the relevant parts of Court of Justice's judgment in said case. The ECJ concluded that there was a situation of different treatment in comparable situations which disadvantaged Arcelor Atlantique. However, it went on to state that the situation is justifiable based on a step-by-step approach like the one adopted by the Commission during the first stage of the implementation of the emissions trading scheme. Such an approach was necessary in light of the novelty and the administrative feasibility of the trading scheme. 37 The Court of First Instance considers this judgment to answer the first part of the plea raised by the applicant and rejects this part of the plea as unfounded. 38 With regard to the second part of the plea, equal treatment in dissimilar situations, the Court finds that all sectors are in fact in a similar situation considering the overall objective of the contested Directive, which is protection of the environment and the polluter-pays principle. 39 Moreover, the Court does not consider it proven that the steel sector finds itself in a different position than all other sectors covered by Annex I to the contested Directive. The plea of illegality based on a breach of the principle of equality is therefore also rejected as unfounded in its entirety.
In relation to the alleged infringement of the freedom of establishment under Article 43 EC (now Article 49 TFEU), the applicant claims that the contested Directive affects his right to transfer production from a less efficient installation in one Member State to a more efficient installation in another Member State since there is no guarantee regarding a corresponding cross-border transfer of allowances. 40 The Court interprets the applicant's plea essentially as claiming that the Community legislature was not lawfully in a position to leave it to the Member States to decide upon the rules regarding cross-border transfer of allowances within a group of undertakings. This could result in diverging national rules, which in turn may result in the infringement of the freedom of establishment. 41 The Court recognizes that the Community institutions must respect the freedom of establishment in the same way as the Member States do. However, it weighs this duty against the principle of subsidiarity that must be respected, especially in case of the adoption of legislation in the form of a Directive. 42 The fact that the Community legislature has not regulated this element of the contested Directive is not necessarily problematic, 43 considering the fact that Member States must also respect the freedom of establishment, together with other general principles of Community law, in the transposition of this Directive. Regarding the contested Directive, the Court considers that the text of this piece of legislation encourages free cross-border transfer and is seen as a prerequisite for a proper functioning emissions allowance scheme. 44 Any infringement of the freedom of establishment therefore stems from national rules adopted by the Member States for which the Community legislature cannot be held responsible. As a result the plea is rejected as unfounded. 45 Finally, the Court considers the applicant's plea regarding the alleged infringement of the principle of legal certainty, which is caused by the fact that the contested Directive is not sufficiently clear and precise. This allegedly makes it impossible for the applicant to plan its economic decisions. 46 In its reflections, the Court states that the objective of the emissions trading scheme of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, could be jeopardized by legislation on the Community level. The uncertainty caused by Member State transposition and fluctuating market prices are therefore necessary components of a successful allowance trading scheme. Moreover, if there is any uncertainty regarding the number of allowances to be assigned, it comes from the final shape of the National Allocation Plans and cannot be attributed to the contested provisions as such. 47 The Court considers any uncertainty present within the allowance market as 'inherent and inseparable from the economic mechanism characterizing the allowance trading scheme'. 48 Therefore the lack of a specific rule establishing a cap or control mechanism for allowance prices does not constitute a manifest breach of the principle of legal certainty, which means this plea must also be rejected.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Community legislature acted unlawfully or committed a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law designed to confer rights on the applicant in adopting the contested Directive. Consequently, the application for damages must be rejected without there being any need to rule on the other conditions giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Community.
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III. Comment
Article 230(4) EC is, and continues to be under Article 263(4) TFEU, the only Union level recourse for private parties in case a legislative measure breaches a fundamental right or a procedural safeguard. Despite the importance that has been attributed to this possibility of redress at the Union level -the fact that national courts cannot declare a Union measure as being invalid or provide a remedy is considered particularly relevant in this context 50 -the conditions for locus standi under Article 230 EC, "direct and individual concern", continue to be extremely narrowly construed, also within the post-Lisbon context of Article 263(4) TFEU. Much academic and judicial debate has centred on the possible relaxation of the conditions for locus standi under this Article 51 and in the 2002 Jégo-Quéré case, 52 the Court of First Instance expressly argued for a more relaxed interpretation. However, to date no noticeable change has been effected in the position of non-privileged applicants.
The capacity restraint of the European Courts may in part explain this restrictive, yet consistent, interpretation of standing under Article 230 EC: some believe that a restrictive interpretation may be all that stands between the Courts and a tsunami of applications. Interestingly, despite this policy 53 a significant rise of the actions under Article 230 EC (now Article 263(4) TFEU) has taken place and the develop-ing case law regarding emissions trading is a case in point. So far all cases brought against the Commission by private companies in this area have been rejected as inadmissible due to lack of standing.
54 Most of these cases concerned the Commission's decision regarding the National Allocation Plans composed by the Member States, 55 rather than the actual Directive instituting the emissions trading scheme as in the current case. Aside from the "floodgate" argument, the Court of Justice has also stressed that the relaxation of the criteria 'direct and individual concern' are beyond its competence and would require a Treaty amendment. 56 An amendment took place with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and Article 263(4) TFEU now reads:
" In the present case, the applicant interpreted this new wording in a manner that would strengthen his position, claiming that the contested directive did not require any implementation measures. This, in turn, would release the application from the obligation to demonstrate that he was individually concerned.
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The Court, however, found that such implementation measures were required and that the Member States in fact had broad discretion regarding the implementation, thereby dismissing the applicant's argument. 58 Moreover, it must be noted that regardless of whether the act requires implementation measures or not, the conditions in Article 263(4) TFEU are cumulative ("and against a regulatory act"), not alternative.
The Court's finding of inadmissibility under Article 230(4) EC is in line with existing case-law and continues to be valid under Article 263(4) TFEU. The same may be said for the Court's discussion of the application for damages. Detailed as this treatment may be, the Court's traditional reticence in this area remains. 59 In light of the Court of Justice's earlier ruling on Arcelor Atlantique 60 , the current case can perhaps best be considered a further 'bullet proofing' of the European emissions trading scheme. The restricted locus standi could not stop private parties, particularly companies, from bringing actions against the scheme. Firmly closing off the road to damages may be more successful in reducing the applicants' incentives to bring actions before the European Courts.
